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We investigate the relationship between life-cycle wages and flexicurity in Denmark. We 
separate permanent from transitory wages and characterise flexicurity using membership of 
unemployment insurance funds. We find that flexicurity is associated with lower wage growth 
heterogeneity over the life-cycle and greater wage instability, changing the nature of wage 
inequality from permanent to transitory. While we are in general unable to formally test for 
moral hazard against adverse selection into unemployment insurance membership, robustness 
checks suggest that moral hazard is the relevant interpretation. 
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1. Introduction 
The Danish “flexicurity” system has often been put forward as a solution to the problems 
of unemployment and labour market rigidity characterising Continental Europe. As is well 
known, in essence the system consists of generous unemployment insurance (UI) coupled 
with the absence of firing restrictions. Therefore, firms are free to manage labour demand, 
while an extended social safety net eliminates poverty risk and preserves social cohesion. 
Increasing labour market flexibility has been the goal of recent labour market reforms in 
Europe, for example Italy and Spain. In these cases, flexibility has been achieved at the 
margin,  e.g.  by  favouring  the  adoption  of  temporary  employment  for  labour  market 
entrants. While effective in reducing firing costs, such a strategy may increase income 
uncertainty to the extent that these  contracts do not act as stepping stones into stable 
employment, inducing segmentation in the labour market. Flexicurity has been advocated 
in these Countries as a way of reducing income insecurity and welfare losses associated 
with labour market reforms. 
In this paper we look at the relationship between individual wages and individual 
membership  of  UI  funds  which  represents  the  security  part  of  the  Danish  flexicurity 
system. There is an extensive literature documenting the disincentive effects that UI may 
exert on job search for the unemployed (see e.g. Lalive and Zweimuller 2004). While 
these effects are concentrated on the duration of unemployment, other studies have shown 
that, by allowing longer search, unemployment benefits may favour higher quality and 
longer lasting matches (Tatsiramos, 2009). While the wage effects of UI schemes are a 
less  investigated  topic,  there  are  reasons  to  believe  that  they  may  also  affect  the 
productivity and wages of the employed, for example through moral hazard effects.  
We are the first to provide evidence on the relationship between individual wages 
and UI. We consider Danish men employed in the private sector during the period 1980-
2003  and  use  population-based  longitudinal  administrative  register  data  to  model 
individual  wage  dynamics,  distinguishing  between  a  long-term  life-cycle  profile  and 
transitory wage shocks. We relate the two wage components to individual membership of 
UI funds. Using time variation in membership status at the individual level, we are able to 
relate membership to changes in the inter-temporal covariance structure of wages. Our 
models are grounded in the well established literature on permanent and transitory wage 
dynamics (Moffitt and Gottschalk 2008).   2 
We model the impact of UI fund membership on two key aspects of the individual 
wage process, life-cycle wage growth and wage instability. We find that UI affects both, 
reducing the heterogeneity of wage growth and increasing wage instability. We interpret 
these results in a moral hazard framework in which the provision of insurance reduces the 
incentives to care about the good insured. In our context, UI reduces incentives to learn 
on-the-job and increases shirking, translating into more compressed life-cycle dynamics 
and more wage instability. Our results also have implications for wage inequality, whose 
nature changes from persistent to volatile when individuals join the UI scheme. 
The  maintained  hypothesis  for  our  interpretations  is  no  selection  into  UI  fund 
membership due to individual wage growth or wage instability. We cannot formally test 
moral hazard against selection, but we do perform a number of robustness checks whose 
results all support moral hazard effects rather than adverse selection. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the policy 
background for flexicurity in Denmark and the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the 
models of wage dynamics used to investigate the impact of flexicurity. Section 4 describes 
the  data  and  the  estimation  sample.  Main  results  are  presented  in  Section  5,  while  in 
Section 6 we subject them to robustness checks.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background  
Flexibility for employers to hire and fire workers and income security for the unemployed 
have  both  long  been  features  of  the  Danish  labour  market.  This  was  combined  with 
effectively unlimited unemployment benefit duration until unemployment peaked in 1993. 
Thereafter  introduction  and  tightening  of  time  limits  and  activation  (job  search  and 
training) requirements coincided with falls in registered unemployment until 2007. It is 
increasingly  recognised  that  the  triplet  flexibility,  income  security  and  activation 
combined  to  facilitate  low  and  stable  registered  unemployment  in  a  Danish  model  of 
flexicurity (Andersen and Svarer, 2007). The remainder of this section details these salient 
features together with the wage setting context in motivation of our empirical work which 
contrasts wage dynamics across sub-populations differentially exposed to flexicurity. 
Employment  protection  in  Denmark  has  been  weak  by  international  standards 
since the 1970’s
1. Most blue-collar workers can be laid off with very short notice, the 
actual length of notice depending on the labour market agreement for the occupation and 
                                                 
1 For a general description of the Danish labour market, see Andersen et al. (2005)   3 
will  usually  depend  on  tenure  in  the  job.  Many  white-collar  workers  and  salaried 
employees are legally guaranteed a certain period of notice in case of layoffs according to 
their tenure in the position (one month per year of employment, up to a maximum of nine 
months after nine years of employment). There is no similar law for blue-collar workers. 
Unemployment  insurance  is  voluntary  and  organised  into  different  funds  along 
occupation and industry lines by labour unions.
2 They have common contribution rates 
and benefits and are heavily subsidised through general taxation. About 83% of the labour 
force  belongs  to  a  UI  fund.  Eligibility  to  benefits  requires  fund  membership  and 
employment  for  12  months.  In  2009  benefits  were  90%  of  mean  earnings  over  the 
previous  three  months  subject  to  a  maximum  gross  monthly  payment  of  €1,800.  The 
average production worker earning monthly €3400 faces a 52% gross replacement rate. 
Both earnings and transfers are taxed, but an 8% tax on labour earnings does not apply to 
unemployment benefits, which implies higher net replacement rates. 
Social assistance is available to those without work who are uninsured or those for 
whom  unemployment  insurance  eligibility  has  expired.  The  level  of  support  varies 
according to family status, age and most importantly is means tested, but would typically 
be 70% of unemployment benefit levels. The means testing implies for example that an 
owner-occupier could not receive benefits. 
Effective conditionality for unemployment benefit receipt was introduced in 1994. 
Previously passive receipt of benefits for up to nine years could be extended indefinitely 
by enrolment in training programmes. Activation in the form of mandatory training and 
job search came in after 4 years of unemployment, where the unemployed is responsible 
for  his  own  activation  followed  by  3  years  where  the  UI  system  takes  responsibility. 
Subsequently these time limits for the passive and active periods were reduced to 2+3 
(1996),  1+3  (1998),  0+2  (2010).  Activation  for  recipients  of  social  assistance  worked 
similarly in principle, but was not enforced until a recent reform which meant both groups 
were treated by the same authority. 
Wage bargaining in the public sector has always been centralised and agreements 
are normally reached every second year. Since 2003 there has been a small element of 
                                                 
2 Neumann et al, (1991) and Clasen and Viebrock (2008) describe organisation, membership and coverage 
of labour unions and unemployment insurance funds. Although there is an overlap between UI fund and 
trade union membership, there is not a one to one relationship between the two nor there exist any formal 
link. Union membership is at a lower rate compared with UI fund membership: 70 percent versus 83 percent. 
   4 
individual negotiation. In the private sector wage bargaining was centralised until 1980. 
Industry-level bargaining was introduced in 1981 and by 1987 (2003) only 34% (15%) of 
wages  were  centrally  bargained.  Bargaining  decentralisation  became  more  and  more 
widespread starting in 1993. There was a minimum amount of firm-level bargaining at 
around 4% until 1993, which increased to 21% by 2003. 
In sum, flexicurity features most directly affect blue collar workers (flexibility) 
and the low waged (income security) post-1993 (activation). This is against a background 
of decentralising wage determination, especially post-1993 to the firm level. 
 
3. Models of wage dynamics with UI fund membership 
Our focus is on the relationship between UI fund membership and wage dynamics. Many 
economic models have been proposed to explain life-cycle wage and earnings growth. 
Rubinstein  and  Weiss  (2006)  in  a  recent  survey  group  these  into  three  broad  classes: 
search, learning and investment. Search models emphasise the role of limited information 
and labour market frictions in determining wages. Workers look for jobs, job offers are 
made,  workers  decide  whether  to  accept  the  offers  and  wages  change  accordingly 
(Burdett,  1978).  Learning  models  focus  on  limited  information  regarding  worker 
productivity. Workers are different, their productivity is only revealed to the employer 
gradually  on-the-job  and  wages  change  accordingly  (Gibbons  and  Waldman,  1999). 
Investment  models  emphasize  human  capital  accumulation  in  school  and  at  work. 
Workers invest in on-the-job training, trade off reduced current for higher future wages 
and wages evolve accordingly (Mincer, 1974).  
Learning and search approaches emphasize within and between job wage growth 
respectively. Simple investment models ignore firm-specific human capital and on-the-job 
training is synonymous with general post-school investment. Many predictions are shared 
between models, but some predictions are distinctive to a particular class. Our aim is not 
to test the theories against each other. Rather, it is to estimate the simplest life-cycle wage 
model that will allow us to compare insured and uninsured workers in a theory-consistent 
way. By ignoring unemployment (assuming unobserved wages are missing at random) and 
employer  identity  (labour  market  experience  is  generic),  we  place  our  study  in  the 
earnings process econometrics literature, but rule out making inferences about job-specific 
wage evolution which would distinguish learning and search approaches. Indeed the only 
distinctive prediction we are able to test by assuming generic labour market experience   5 
comes from a simple model of investment in human capital. This merits describing in 
more detail as it will be the focus of interpretation of our model estimates. 
This Mincer model of human capital investment can account for important features 
of life-cycle earnings.
3 After completing formal schooling and joining the labour force, 
workers forgo some potential earnings for the sake of investment in on-the-job training. 
This lowers earnings early in the work career and increases earnings later as returns to 
post-school investments accumulate. In the absence of investment in training, potential 
earnings equal observed earnings at labour market entry. With post-school investment, 
there is an “overtaking point” at which observed and potential earnings are equal. One can 
think of this as a break-even point at which the earnings of investors and non-investors 
coincide.  It  is  also  termed  the  Mincerian  cross-over  because  it  is  the  point  at  which 
differently shaped earnings profiles intersect. 
Obviously one needs to carefully model individual life-cycle profiles in order to 
capture these phenomena, since observed earnings carry information about both long-term 
(or permanent) earnings and transitory fluctuations reflecting the unstable component of 
the earnings process. The distinction between two sources of income variation goes back 
at least to Friedman (1957) and empirically has been extensively investigated starting with 
the work of Lillard and Willis (1978). A number of studies have formalised permanent 
earnings over the life-cycle as an individual-specific age or experience profile, in which 
individual-specific  intercepts  measure  human  capital  at  labour  market  entry,  whereas 
individual-specific slopes represent heterogeneity in productivity growth; a model that is 
typically referred to as a random growth model. Examples in the literature include Lillard 
and Weiss (1979), Hause (1980), Baker (1997), Haider (2001), Baker and Solon (2003), 
Cappellari (2004) and Gladden and Taber (2009). In this model, the Mincerian trade-off 
between initial earnings and earnings growth induced by training on-the-job translates into 
a negative covariance between individual-specific intercepts and slopes. 
In this paper we are interested in the relationship between UI fund membership and 
life-cycle wage dynamics. We model wage dynamics distinguishing between long-term or 
permanent wages and transitory fluctuations, and specify the former as a random growth 
process consistent with a Mincerian model. In principle both the permanent and transitory 
wage components may depend on membership of a UI fund, for example because it may 
                                                 
3 Surveys and extensions of the Mincerian earnings function approach are to be found in Heckman, Lochner, 
and Todd (2008) and Rubinstein and Weiss (2006).   6 
affect  incentives  to  learn  or  job  retention.  Therefore  we  extend  standard  models  of 
permanent  and  transitory  wages  and  allow  UI  fund  membership  to  impact  on  the 
parameters governing both wage components. In what follows we start by specifying a 
standard model of wage dynamics which serves as a benchmark for our results; next we 
extend this baseline specification to account for the role of UI fund membership. 
 
3.1 Baseline model 
Our  baseline  specification  is  grounded  in  the  extensive  literature  on  the 
permanent/transitory decomposition of wages, (see Moffitt and, Gottschalk 2008, for a 
recent survey). We specify a model of individual wages and estimate the parameters of 
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where wict is individual (i) log-wage deviation from the period (t) and cohort (c) specific 
mean, P and T superscripts denote permanent and transitory components, and the time 
span of observation is cohort specific. Permanent and transitory wages are orthogonal by 
definition, which allows their identification. 
In  line  with  the  literature  on  random  growth  models,  we  specify  long-term  or 
permanent  wages  as  an  individual-specific  linear  profile  in  potential  labour  market 








β , σαβ);  (2) 
 
According to this specification, each individual’s permanent wage is characterised by a 
starting wage (αi) and a growth rate (βi). The variances of individual-specific parameters 
(σ
2
α  and σ
2
β) capture the degree of heterogeneity along these two dimensions, say due to 
initial ability and ability to accumulate productive skills once in the labour market. The 
covariance term (σαβ) is also relevant. As discussed above, a negative covariance indicates 
the existence of Mincerian a cross-over (Hause, 1980). Alternatively a positive covariance 
suggests  that  those  with  higher  schooling  learn  faster  on-the-job.  Random  growth 
represents the core of our permanent wage specification, and we allow it to flexibly vary   7 
over birth cohorts and calendar time through a set of loading factors πt and λc.
4 Note that 
the  time  shifters  can  account  for  changes  in  the  economic  environment  over  time, 
including the sequence of labour market reforms discussed in the previous section, so that 
estimation of random growth parameters will not be biased by secular trends. Assuming 
independence between potential labour market experience and random growth parameters, 
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βEXPitEXPis + σαβ(EXPit + EXPis)] πtπsλ
2
c   (3) 
 
where EXPi is the vector collecting individual observations of potential labour market 
experience.
5 
For the transitory wage model, in line with previous studies we adopt a low order 
ARMA  process,  in  order  to  capture  the  fact  that  shocks  to  wages  do  not  fade  away 
instantaneously, but only after a few time periods. In particular, here we adopt an AR(1).
6 
We also allow for flexible time and cohort specific shifters in the transitory wage. Finally, 
as discussed by MaCurdy (1982), we treat the process as non-stationary and explicitly 
model the variance of its initial condition. In sum:    
 
 
Wage instability is captured by the variance of white noise innovations, σ
2
ε. The 
AR(1)  parameters  and  the  non-parametric  shifters  are  the  argument  for  the  auto-
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2
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4 Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Alvarez, Browning and Ejrnæs (2010) estimate models of wage changes. 
There are no time or cohort shifters in those models and their approach would be inappropriate for our 
purposes because age/experience parameters would be confounded with calendar time or cohort effects. 
5  As  discussed  in  Gladden  and  Taber  (2009)  the  assumption  of  independence  between  random  growth 
parameters and labour market experience, which is ubiquitous in the literature, fails if actual experience (i.e. 
time actually spent working since entering the labour market) is used in place of potential experience due to 
endogenous intermittency of labour force participation. 
6 We also experimented with ARMA(1,1) specifications, but encountered convergence issues which suggests 
lack of identification of the MA component in our data. See Baker and Solon (2003) for similar remarks. 
w
T
ict = τtµcvit ;      vit =ρvit-1 + εit     εit∼ (0; σ
2
ε)   vit0c∼ (0; σ
2
0).  (4)   8 
where d0c is a dummy for variances in the first year of observation, ddc is a dummy for 
variances  in  subsequent  years  and  d1  is  a  dummy  for  covariances.  The  orthogonality 
assumption in (1) implies that the total wage auto-covariance results from the sum of (3) 
and (5). 
 
3.2 Model with UI fund membership 
We now extend the baseline model to allow for individual membership of a UI fund in 
each wage component. As discussed in the previous section, membership is voluntary and 
individuals may change membership status, which generates time variation in membership 
at  the  individual  level.  Also,  we  know  that  typically  labour  market  entrants  are  not 
insured, so that any impact of UI fund membership on entry wages would be both unlikely 
to  occur  and  hard  to  interpret  (see  Ibsen  and  Westergård-Nielsen,  2008,  and  the  data 
description  in  the  next  section).  We  therefore  augment  the  random  growth  model  by 
allowing for a change in individual wage growth associated with membership.
7 Let Fit be a 
dummy indicator for whether individual i is a UI fund member in year t. Our extended 
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(6) 
 
The additional individual-specific parameter δi measures the change in the slope of 
the individual experience profile associated with membership of a UI fund. The second 
moments of δi provide information on the degree of heterogeneity in slope differentials 
(σ
2
δ) and their interrelationships with baseline intercepts and slopes (σαδ   and σβδ ). For 
example,  the  sign  of  σβδ   indicates  whether  the  wage  growth  of  fast  tracks  (high  β) 
accelerates (high δ, σβδ positive) or slows down (low δ, σβδ negative) with membership. 
Assuming  independence  between  the  membership  dummy  Fit  and  the  vector  of 
individual  specific  parameters  (αi,  βi  δi),  the  inter-temporal  covariance  structure  for 
permanent wages becomes: 
 
                                                 
7 In preliminary analyses we also used a model with differential entry wages for members, finding results 
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where Fi is the vector collecting individual observations of UI fund membership. 
Several points need to be made about identification of the additional parameters. 
First, identification requires individual level variation in UI fund membership over time 
periods and birth cohorts. This is something that is present in our data as we document in 
the data section. Second, we are not assuming independence of membership and potential 
experience, which would contradict the empirical observation that it takes some time in 
the labour market before individuals become members; rather, we exploit the correlation 
between the two variables for estimating the extra parameters. Third, while we cannot test 
the  assumption  of  independence  between  individual  specific  parameters  and  the 
membership dummy, in Section 6 we provide robustness checks indicating that our results 
are not driven by selection into membership. 
To characterise the link between wage instability and UI fund membership, we need 
to take a different approach to the one followed with the permanent wage, given that the 
instability parameter σ
2
ε is not individual-specific. We therefore parameterise the variance 
of white noise innovations with respect to the  incidence of insurance  coverage  across 







ε exp(ψFct)  (8) 
 
Since  the  incidence  of  membership  varies  across  cohorts  and  time,  the  resulting 
instability parameter varies with c and t, which identifies ψ. A positive estimate of ψ 
would indicate a positive association between wage instability and UI membership. Note 
that  cohort  and  time  trends  in  the  transitory  wage  are  already  controlled  for  non-
parametrically  by  the  factor  loadings  τ  and  µ,  so  that  ψ  will  not  capture  variation  in 
instability over cohorts and time, but rather the effect of UI on instability in a difference-
in-differences setup. Substituting σ
2
ε in (5) with σ
2
εct yields the theoretical transitory wage 
auto-covariance function that we use in the analysis. Adding it to (7) provides the total 
                                                 
8  The  approach  is  similar  in  spirit  to  the  one  adopted  by  Baker  and  Solon  (2003)  to  parameterise  the 
association between instability and age.   10 
wage auto-covariance function that accounts for UI fund membership, which we denote 
Ω(θ,  Xi),  where  θ  is  the  parameter  vector  that  contains  random  growth  terms,  AR 
parameters  and  the  non-parametric  shifters  for  periods  and  cohorts  on  each  wage 
component, while Xi is the union of EXPi and Fi.      
We estimate θ by Minimum Distance (see Chamberlain, 1984; Haider, 2001). This is 
an application of the GMM: the inter-temporal auto-covariance function of wages implied 
by the specified model is mapped into empirical second moments of the within-cohort 
inter-temporal distribution of wages Ac=Nc
-1Σi∈cAi, Ai being the individual contribution to 
Ac  and  Nc  the  size  of  cohort  c.  Let  ai=vech(Ai),  and  ω(θ,  Xi)=  vech[Ω(θ,  Xi)].  The 
parameter vector is identified by the following set of moment restrictions:  
 
Ε[ai - ω(θ, Xi)]=0  (9) 
 
Details of the estimation method are provided in the Appendix. 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
We use administrative register data on gross hourly wages for the Danish labour force 
between 1980 and 2003. We consider men only, in common with the literature on wage 
components  models,  with  the  aim  of  excluding  the  more  intermittent  labour  force 
participation  of  women  which  would  otherwise  inflate  wage  instability.  Similarly,  we 
focus on prime age men, aged 21-55, who are full-time private sector employees.  
Given that we work on within cohort wage differentials, it is important to define 
sample selection also according to the year of birth. In order to have a sufficiently long 
period of observation we require that each cohort is observed for at least ten time periods. 
The  youngest birth cohort in our sample is the one that turns 21 (and thus meets the 
selection criteria on age) in 1994 (and thus is observed at least ten times periods before the 
sample  period  ends),  i.e.  the  birth  cohort  of  1973..  In  principle,  we  could  reason 
symmetrically at the other end of the sample period and use as the oldest group men that 
turn 55 in 1989 (thus being observed at least ten times after the beginning of the sample 
period),  i.e.  the  birth  cohort  of  1934.  However,  the  information  needed  to  reconstruct 
potential  labour  market  experience  –  in  turn  a  crucial  variable  for  the  analysis  —  is 
censored  for  older  cohorts,  and  the  oldest  cohort  for  which  we  have  the  information 
needed in the analysis is that of 1943. In sum, we use information on men born between   11 
1943 and 1973, and we group them into 31 single-year birth cohorts. We allow individuals 
in these cohorts to enter and exit the panel according to the specified age criteria even if 
there are valid observations for them outside this age range, inducing a rotating panel 
design by cohort (see Baker and Solon, 2003). 
The last sample selections are related to the hourly wage variable. First we drop 
observations for which the wage is recorded at zero. Secondly, we drop the lower and 
upper 0.5 percent of the resulting wage distribution of each year. Next we further exclude 
(the remaining few) wage observations falling below the minimum wage. Finally, for each 
individual, we require valid wage observations for at least five consecutive years to ease 
the identification of individual wage profiles.
9 The latter restriction implies that our panel 
is not fully unbalanced, thus mitigating the issues that previous researchers have found 




Descriptive statistics for our sample are presented in Table 1. As a benchmark, we 
also  provide  statistics  for  the  overall  population  of  men  aged  21-55  employed  in  the 
private sector. The estimating sample consists of roughly 810,000 individuals for a total of 
about  12.5  million  person-year  observations.  Equivalent  numbers  in  the  comparison 
population of private sector prime-aged male employees are about 1.4 million an 17.0 
million, with the larger churning in the latter group reflecting the fact that there we do not 
restrict to specific birth cohorts and do not impose restrictions about the minimum number 
of consecutive valid wage observations. There are differences concerning the average age. 
In  particular,  limiting  the  set  of  birth  cohorts  translates  into  faster  growth  of  the  age 
variable in the sample compared with the population. This is also reflected in the wage 
distribution. In both  cases there is real wage growth and increasing dispersion. Average 
hourly wages increase by 28 percent in our sample between 1980 and 2003, while the 
corresponding figure is 16 percent if we look at the comparison population. Also, the 
standard deviation of the distribution almost doubles in the sample, while it grows by 37 
                                                 
9 This latter sample selection rule is intermediate between the one used by Baker and Solon (2003), i.e. 
continuous earnings strings for each individual, and the approach of Haider (2001), who allows individuals 
to move in and out of the sample with the only requirement of having two positive but not  necessarily 
consecutive  valid  observations  on  earnings.  As  a  robustness  check    we  also  estimated  the  main  model 
requiring only a minimum of two consecutive wage observations per worker. Our conclusions, discussed in 
the next section, were unaffected by the use of this alternative sample.   12 
percent  in  the  labour  force.  Finally,  the  table  reports  tabulation  of  unemployment 
insurance coverage. As can be seen this is rather high in both the estimating sample and 
the  comparison  population.  However,  in  the  former  case  it  grows  more  substantially 
during the middle years of the panel and, again, the fact that there are no young cohorts 




Table  2  provides  an  overview  of  the  cohort  structure  of  the  estimating  sample. 
Reading  the  table  by  column,  one  can  have  the  visual  impression  of  the  patterns  of 
presence/absence of each cohort over time, while the number in each cell indicates the 
percentage of workers belonging to that cohort in a given year. Cohorts born between 
1943 and 1947 reach the age of 55 before the end of the sample period and therefore stop 
contributing between 1999 and 2003. Intermediate cohorts (born between 1948 and 1959) 
belong to the 21-55 age range throughout the sample period. Finally cohorts born from 
1960 onwards turn 21 after 1980, and therefore start contributing to estimation after the 
beginning  of  the  sample  period.  The  unbalanced-by-cohort  panel  design  provides 




As seen above, UI covers a substantial portion of the sample. Those statistics are 
cross-sectional and uninformative about individual level variation in UI fund membership 
over time, which is crucial for the estimation of our model. Existing studies show that 
there is an age related element to UI fund membership, namely individuals join a few 
years after entry in the labour market, say in their late 20’s or early 30’s (see Ibsen and 
Westergaard-Nielsen,  2008).  In  order  to  provide  more  direct  evidence  on  individual 
variation in UI fund membership, in Table 3 we exploit the longitudinal and birth cohort 
dimension  of  the  data.  The  table  reports  entry  and  exit  rates  to  and  from  UI  fund 
membership  by  birth  cohort,  defined  as  the  proportions  becoming  members  or  non-
members from one year to the next. As can be seen, there is some “churning” between 
membership and non membership, with exit rates that are considerably lower than entries.   13 
Importantly, transition rates are higher for younger cohorts, reflecting that on average the 




As a last piece of descriptive evidence, we present the covariance structure of time 
and cohort de-trended log-hourly wages, i.e. the empirical second moments of the inter-
temporal wage distribution that are to be analysed by means of the model presented in 
Section 3. Figure 1 plots the wage variances and covariances (of order 1, 3 and 5) for 
selected birth cohorts. Each of the series is increasing over time, which reflects the growth 
of  wage  dispersion  obvious  from  Table  1.  For  each  cohort,  the  series  tends  to  shift 
downwards as we move from the variance to higher order auto-covariances. This reflects 
the presence of transitory wage shocks that show up in the variance but fade away the 
greater  the  time  interval  over  which  covariances  are  estimated.  Finally,  also  note  a 
downward  shift  in  the  covariance  structure  as  we  move  to  younger  cohorts.  This  is 
consistent with heterogeneous growth rates in permanent wages. 
 
5. Results 
Before discussing the central results about flexicurity and life-cycle wage dynamics, it is 
instructive to look at overall model predictions in terms of variance decomposition over 




For each cohort the predicted total variance increases over the period reproducing 
the  evidence  from  Figure  1.  Moreover  the  patterns  of  predicted  total  variance  mimic 
almost identically the ones of the actual wage moments, which may not be surprising 
given  the  presence  of  flexible  shifters  by  cohort  and  time  on  each  wage  component. 
Considering  the  variance  decomposition  implied  by  the  model  reveals  that  permanent 
wage inequality seems to be the driver of increasing total variance most of time and for 
most cohorts. Wage instability, on the other hand, is generally constant, except for the end 
of  the  period,  when  it  first  decreases  and  then  increases.  Overall,  the  last  years  of   14 
increasing inequality seem to be driven by instability. These patterns differ across cohorts: 




5.1 Baseline model. 
In Table 4 we report the core parameter estimates for the wage model of Section 3, while 
the full set of estimated time and birth cohort shifters on the two wage components are 
presented in Appendix Table A1.
10 We start by describing results for the baseline model, 
i.e. the model resulting from equations (1) and (4), which does not allow for an impact of 
flexicurity on the wage components These estimates are presented in the first column of 
the table. 
Parameters  of  the  permanent  component  indicate  the  existence  of  substantial 
heterogeneity in both starting wages (σ
2
α ) and wage growth rates (σ
2
β). The estimates 
imply that someone located one standard deviation above the mean in the distribution of 
wage growth rates sees his wage growing 2.8 percentage points faster than the mean (=
2
β σ ). The two sources of heterogeneity are negatively correlated (σαβ<0): individuals 
who enter the labour market with high wages also experience the slowest growth over the 
life-cycle, and vice-versa. The result is common to many studies in the literature: see 
Hause (1980), Baker (1997), Baker and Solon (2003), Gladden and Taber (2009). The 
leading  interpretation  for  this  finding  is  that  it  reflects  the  trade-off  between  initial 
earnings and earnings growth as predicted by the Mincer model. We should therefore 
expect  a  cross-over  of  wage  profiles.  Long-term  inequality  first  decreases  and  then 
increases over the life-cycle, increases taking place after the cross-over. Hause (1980) 




11 Our estimate of the cross-over from this baseline model is at 
4.25  years  of  potential  labour  market  experience  (s.e.=0.15),  approximately  one  year 
larger than the estimate obtained by Hause in a sample of Swedish men in the 1960s. 
                                                 
10 Models with unrestricted loading factors produced negative and non significant estimates of the permanent 
wage loading factors for the two youngest cohorts. To overcome this issue, we constrained permanent wage 
loading factors to be the same on the five youngest cohorts . Core parameter estimates were very similar in 
the constrained and unconstrained models. 
11 Note that this is also the negative of the regression coefficient of intercepts on slopes.   15 
Consider now the transitory wage of the baseline specification. All core parameters 
are precisely estimated. The autoregressive coefficient indicates the weight that lagged 
transitory shocks have on earnings volatility, the weight being given by the coefficient 
exponentiated  using  the  lag.  The  estimate  of  ρ  (=0.77)    implies  that  the  effects  of 
transitory innovation is negligible after ten years. Note also that the variance of initial 
conditions  (σ
2
0)  is  precisely  estimated,  which  illustrates  the  relevance  of  treating  the 
process as non-stationary.  
 
5.2 Model with UI fund membership 
The second column of Table 4 presents estimated parameters for permanent and transitory 
wages in the model with UI fund membership. There is a substantial difference in wage 
growth between members and non-members of UI funds, the estimated variance of wage 
growth differentials σ
2
δ  being statistically significant and of a size that is comparable with 
the baseline parameter σ
2
β . However, taken in isolation this coefficient is not informative 
on  whether  UI  is  associated  with  more  or  less  growth  rate  heterogeneity.  Making 
statements about the way wage profiles change when individuals are members of UI funds 
requires taking into account the estimated covariances between baseline parameters and 
slope  shifters.  The  covariance  between  baseline  slopes  and  slope  shifters  (σβδ)  is 
statistically significant and negative, indicating  that UI fund membership is associated 
with compression of the distribution of wage  growth rates, which would occur if fast 
tracks slow down on joining a UI fund. These estimates imply that someone located one 
standard deviation above the mean in the distribution of wage growth rates sees his wage 
growing 2.9 percent (= βδ δ β σ σ σ 2
2 2 + + ) faster than the mean if he is a member, which 
compares with 3.9 percent for non-members (=
2
β σ ). Consequently, as labour market 
experience accumulates, permanent inequality becomes greater among non-members than 
members.  The  other  new  parameter  in  the  model  with  UI  fund  membership  (i.e.  the 
covariance  between  intercepts  and  the  slope  shifter  σαδ)  is  positive  (and  significant), 
which is coherent with the other two negative covariances estimated for this model. These   16 
parameters combine to generate a cross-over point that is very similar for members and 





Estimated patterns of permanent wage inequality over the life-cycle for members 
and non members are reported in Figure 3, which uses core random growth parameters 
(without  the  period  and  cohort  factor  loadings)  to  predict  the  variance  of  permanent 
wages.  The  random  growth  model  implies  that  life-cycle  inequality  is  quadratic  in 
experience. At the start of the life-cycle the two profiles overlap by construction. During 
the  initial  phase  of  the  working  life,  permanent  inequality  is  low  and  almost 
indistinguishable between the two groups. Some differences start to emerge after ten years 
of experience, and they are apparent by twenty years. By the end of the working life the 
gap between the two groups is sizeable. Non-members have long-term inequality that is 
almost double that of members. 
Consider now the transitory wage in the main model. Comparing these results with 
those from the baseline model shows that parameter estimates are rather stable. The one 
parameter whose estimate differs across models is the variance of AR(1) innovations (σ
2
ε), 
and the reason is that in the baseline case the parameter measures average (across levels of 
UI  membership)  instability,  whereas  in  the  second  it  measures  instability  for  the 
(hypothetical)  case  of  no  UI  membership.  The  additional  parameter  ψ  measures  the 
instability shift associated with UI fund membership. The positive estimate indicates that 




We use estimates of the random growth parameters, the AR(1) parameters and the 
factor loadings on time and cohorts to predict inequality in the two wage components for 
members and non-members of UI funds over the life-cycle. For each birth cohort we use 
parameter estimates to predict variance components, and then average predictions over 
                                                 
12 Note that the computed cross-over point is a non linear function of estimated parameters so that the point 
computed in the baseline model does not need to belong to the interval defined by the equivalent points for 
members and non-members in the model with UI membership.   17 
cohorts. Results are presented in Figure 4. The graph shows in Panel a) that UI fund 
membership is associated to lower permanent inequality throughout the life-cycle, with 
the  gap  between  non-members  and  members  widening  with  potential  labour  market 
experience. This reflects the large dispersion of wage growths rates found among non-
members. Transitory inequality has the opposite pattern, see panel b) of the graph. There 
is a decline of earnings instability with experience for both members and non-members, 
reflecting the lower volatility of older cohorts. Differences between members and non-
members are striking. For non members the decline is smooth and almost complete within 
the first ten  years of labour market experience. For members, the life-cycle decline is 
slower (actually there is a slight increase over initial years) and there is no tendency for 
instability to disappear even for high levels of labour market experience. Overall, Figure 4 
illustrates that membership of UI funds is associated with a shift in the nature of wage 
differentials, from permanent to transitory.  
 
5.3 Discussion 
These results show that while permanent inequality is lower for UI fund members because 
of more compressed returns to experience, their wage instability is larger than that of non 
members. Moral hazard effects can explain both results. Being insured may weaken the 
incentives to care about the good which is insured, in this case being employed. Covered 
workers  may  for  example  lose  incentives  to  acquire  new  productive  skills  on-the-job, 
which in turn would reduce wage progression. In particular, our results suggest that such 
an  effect  should  be  more  pronounced  for  individuals  that,  before  being  insured, 
experienced the fastest growth. Moral hazard may, in the limit, result in a job loss. This 
would make the work history more unstable and generate the greater wage instability that 
we observe. According to this interpretation, UI has a causal effect on the wage process, 
and changes the nature of wage inequality from permanent to transitory.  
Clearly, the validity of moral hazard interpretations requires that the identification 
assumptions introduced in Section 3 hold. First we have assumed independence between 
UI fund membership and individual specific wage growth differentials, which enabled us 
to  derive  the  moment  restrictions  for  permanent  wages  in  the  model  with  UI  fund 
membership,  see  equation  (7).  Second,  we  have  assumed  that  differences  in  wage 
instability across cohorts and time periods are absorbed by the set of birth cohorts and 
calendar time shifters on transitory wages, so that we can use variation in the incidence of   18 
UI  fund  membership  across  cohorts-period  cells  to  estimate  the  association  between 
flexicurity and instability, which is the parameter ψ in equation (8). 
Adverse selection into UI membership may lead to violation of the identification 
assumptions. One can think of examples of selection when there is heterogeneity in either 
wage growth and employment (and thence wage) instability. For example, learning ability 
may be seen as a way to insure oneself against the risks of job loss. When workers reach 
the  peak  of  learning  capacity  and  their  wage  growth  slows  down,  they  may  think  of 
supplementing learning-based self insurance with fund-based insurance. Hence, it would 
not be the presence of  UI that weakens wage  growth, but rather the anticipation of a 
slowdown  in  wage  progression  that  induces  individuals  to  join the  scheme.  Similarly, 
individuals  with  intrinsically  low  job  attachment  (and  therefore  highly  volatile  wage 
profiles)  may  join  the  insurance  scheme  more  than  workers  with  higher  employment 
stability. We assess the plausibility of adverse selection interpretations in the next section. 
 
6. Sensitivity analyses 
We begin our robustness checks by looking for evidence of selection into membership due 
to lagged wage growth and lagged wage volatility. In the presence of adverse selection 
effects  we  should  observe  a  negative  effect  of  lagged  wage  growth  on  UI  fund 
membership --because individuals join a fund when wage growth slows down-- and a 
positive  relationship  between  lagged  wage  instability  and  membership  --because 
individuals join a fund when their wage profiles become more volatile. We define wage 
growth as the log wage change between two consecutive years, and we estimate models in 
which individual membership indicators are regressed on lagged wage growth. We proxy 
wage instability (which is a variance and thus is not defined at the individual level) using 
individual specific measures of wage volatility. For this exercise, we take an approach 
similar  to  Gottschalk  and  Moffitt  (1994)  and  derive  transitory  wages  as  the  log-wage 
deviation from individual specific multi-year averages.  In our case, we average wages 
over 5-year rolling windows and consider only cases that belong to the balanced panel of 
each  window.  Wage  volatility  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  either  squared  or  absolute 
deviations from the average.
13 We regress UI membership indicators upon the lags of 
these volatility measures. 
                                                 
13 Ziliak et al (2011) use series of bi-annual panels from the U.S. Currerrent Population Survey and define 




Results are reported in Table 5. All models include controls for industry and local 
unemployment (i.e. the main determinants of UI fund membership) plus time and age 
trends. The outcome variable in these regression is the individual sequence of UI fund 
membership status, limiting the sample to cases in which individuals join the UI scheme. 
In  particular  we  focus  on  sequences  in  which  there  is  non-membership  for  3  years  
followed by membership in the fourth year, after which we stop following the individual, 
and sequences in which non-membership for 3 years is followed by membership until the 
end of the observation window. Analysis of the first type of sequence conveys information 
about joining the UI scheme, whereas we use the second type of sequence to look at stable 
entries into the scheme. Given the particular type of sample selection rules applied, we 
used fixed effects regressions throughout in order to avoid issues of spurious correlation 
induced  by  (time  invariant)  unobserved  heterogeneity.  We  analyse  the  membership 
sequences by logit and linear probability models.  
The first row of Table 5 reports results for lagged wage growth.
14 The sign of the 
estimated coefficients is always positive, whereas they are statistically significant only in 
the right part of the table in which stable entries into UI is analysed. More importantly for 
our  purposes,  none  of  the  estimated  effects  is  negative,  as  would  be  the  case  in  the 
presence of selection effects 
In the lower rows of the table we look at the relationship between UI entries and 
lagged  wage  volatility.  In  each  of  the  cases  considered  the  regression  coefficient  is 
negative  and  statistically  significant,  pointing  towards  a  negative  association  between 
lagged volatility and the decision to join a UI fund. This is the opposite to what one would 
expect  if  selection  on  wage  instability  was  driving  the  membership  decision.  Taken 





                                                 
14 The table only reports coefficients of interest. Full sets of estimates are available upon request.   20 
Our second robustness check is based on adjusting individual earnings for the effects 
of the main determinants of UI fund membership, namely industrial affiliation and the 
local unemployment rate. The aim of this exercise is to remove, in a reduced form fashion, 
the effects of observed heterogeneity in membership determinants from raw wages before 
estimating wage second moments. If unobserved heterogeneity in UI fund membership is 
driving our results and if this heterogeneity is correlated with observed UI determinants, 
then  estimates  from  the  model  with  UI  fund  membership  should  be  sensitive  to  the 
adjustment for UI determinants.  
Results from this exercise are presented in the first column of Table 6. Comparing 
these  with  their  counterparts  in  Table  4,  it  is  evident  that  findings  are  robust  to  the 
adjustment of raw earnings for the determinants of UI fund membership. Some of the 
estimated parameters, namely the variances of time-invariant components of permanent 
wages,  are  now  smaller,  which  is  a  consequence  of  having  removed  sources  of 
heterogeneity  from  the  data.  However,  the  general  pattern  of  estimates  confirms  the 
evidence in Table 4, the main differences being larger variance of wage growth and lower 
autoregressive coefficients. Overall, results suggest that heterogeneity in the determinants 
of UI fund membership is not driving our main findings. 
Our final robustness check concentrates on the second of our results, i.e. the positive 
effect of UI membership on instability. We allow the effect to differ across groups of 
workers which are known to be characterised by different degrees of wage or employment 
instability. If the result from Section 5.2 was driven by the selection of more unstable 
workers into UI membership, then we expect to find it only within more unstable groups. 
We have identified two dimensions along which there may be relevant differences in the 
stability of the employment relationship, namely industry and occupation. In each case, we 
consider a binary partition of the variable of interest. As for the first dimension, we divide 
metal  manufacturing  workers  from  the  rest  of  the  sample,  because  wages  are  more 
variable in this industry as there are more performance-based contracts. As for occupation, 
we  consider  the  manual/non-manual  partition,  with  the  former  group  being  the  more 
unstable and having more varying wage contracts.
15 In each of the two cases, we interact 
                                                 
15 Due to data limitations, we could estimate this particular model only for the 1980-1995 period. To solve 
some convergence issues arising over this shorter time interval, we calibrated σαδ   using its estimate from 
Table 4.   21 
the  binary  partition  with  UI  membership,  and  use  this  interaction  to  model  wage 






εexp(ψ1P1Fct + ψ2P2Fct)  (10) 
 
where P1Fct and P2Fct denote the incidence of insurance membership in the more and less 
wage-stable group, respectively. 
Results of this exercise are collected in the second and third columns of Table 6. In 
each case we find that the positive relationship between UI fund membership and wage 
instability is not dependent on the specific group of workers considered. Even for the more 
stable groups of workers (non-metal manufacturing and non-manual workers) there is a 
positive effect of UI fund membership on instability.  
All of the robustness checks in this section support the view that selection into UI 
funds  does  not  drive  our  headline  results.  This  favours  a  moral  hazard  interpretation 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
We have considered the relationship between individual wage trajectories over the life-
cycle and membership of unemployment insurance funds in Denmark – the security part 
of flexicurity. We have used the population of prime-aged male private sector employee 
wages  for  24  years  to  decompose  the  wage  process  into  its  permanent  and  transitory 
components and we have characterised the impact of insurance fund membership on each 
component. 
We find that membership is associated with a reduction in wage growth rate heterogeneity 
that compresses the long-term or permanent wage distribution. On the other hand, there is 
greater wage instability among UI fund members. We interpret these two findings as the 
symptoms  of  moral  hazard  effects  associated  with  UI  fund  membership.  More 
homogeneous life-cycle profiles associated with UI fund membership are consistent with 
lower  incentives  to  accumulate  skills  on-the-job.  Alternatively,  the  greater  earnings 
instability  associated  with  UI  fund  membership  may  results  from  greater  employment 
instability. In principle our results could also stem from worker selection into membership 
of UI funds. We therefore subject the main findings to several robustness checks, all of 
which favour a moral hazard interpretation.    22 
These results add to the literature on the effect of unemployment benefit by showing 
that UI may exert some effect also on employed individuals. Unemployment insurance 
exists to smooth consumption between periods of work by reducing transitory income 
fluctuations. We find UI fund members to have less permanent and more transitory wage 
dispersion than non-members. This greater transitory income variation in-work partially 
offsets reduced income variation when unemployed for the insured.   23 
Appendix: Minimum Distance estimation of the wage model 
Estimation  is  based  on  the  identifying  moment  restrictions  in  (9).  Let  m*(θ,  Zi)≡ ai-
ω(θ,Xi), be the moment function of the model, that depends on the parameter vector θ and 
observables in the data Zi (wages and observed characteristics). The set of identifying 
restrictions can be restated as  
 
Ε[m*(θ, Zi)]=0  (A1) 
 
We work with within-cohort auto-covariance structures, which enable us to separate 
time  and  cohort  effects  (see  Baker  and  Solon,  2003).  Thus,  the  number  of  moment 
restrictions available depends upon both the number of time periods and the number of 
cohorts. Due to the revolving panel design, not all cohorts contribute to estimation for all 
periods, see Table 2. Let Sc=Kc-t0c denote the number of periods cohort c contributes to the 
analysis:  for  each  cohort  we  have  Sc(Sc  -1)/2+Sc  moment  restrictions.  Some  cohorts 
contribute to analysis for the whole 24 years period, generating 300 moment restrictions. 
The youngest cohort is observed only for 10 years, yielding 55 moment restrictions. We 
have L=ΣcSc= 6895 moment restrictions in total. 
The cohort structure of the data implies that an individual will not contribute to all 
the L moment restrictions, but only to the ones generated by his cohort. Moreover, the 
(partially) unbalanced panel design means that an individual may not contribute to all the 
moment restrictions of his cohort, but only for the ones referring to time points in which 
he is actually observed. Let ril be a dummy indicator for whether individual i contributes 
to  moment  restriction  l.  We  can  work  with  an  alternative  moment  function  whose  l
th 
element is defined as ml(θ, ril, Zi) ≡ rilm*(θ, Zi)+(1-ril)0. The GMM estimator with missing 
moment  contributions is based on the following identifying restriction: 
 
Ε[m(θ, ri, Zi)]=0  (A2) 
 
where ri is the vector collecting the L observations on ril and m(θ, ri, Zi) is the column 
vector collecting the L moment restrictions ml(θ, ril, Zi). The estimator based on (A2) is 
consistent for θ provided that observations are missing at random. We note that we have 
two types of missing observations, between and within cohorts. The first type is artificially   24 
generated by the fact that we stack the within-cohort empirical auto-covariance function 
across cohorts, and there is no problem of endogenous attrition. There may be some issue 
of endogenous attrition within cohort. However, as pointed out by Haider (2001), in this 
context  one  likely  source  of  attrition  non-randomness  would  arise  if  moments  were 
computed for all cohorts jointly and there were cohort effects in attrition, something that 
we rule out by working with within-cohort empirical moments.  




-1Σim(θ, ri, Zi)]’W [N
-1Σi m(θ, ri, Zi)]  (A3) 
 
where W is some suitable weighting matrix 
Chamberlain  (1984)  shows  that  asymptotic  efficiency  requires  weighting  the 
minimisation problem with the inverse of the fourth moment matrix V. However, Antolnji 
and  Segal  (1996)  show  that  the  efficient  estimator  may  be  biased  due  to  correlation 
between second and fourth moments. They suggest using the Equally Weighted estimator 
(W=I),  and  to  adjust  standard  errors  post  estimation.  We  follow  that  procedure  and 
estimate  the  variance  as  Var(θ)=(G’G)
-1G’VG(G’G)
-1,  where  G  is  the  gradient  matrix 
evaluated at the solution of the minimisation problem.   25
Appendix Table 1: Estimates of shifters for time periods and birth cohorts (continues on next page) 
  Main model    Main model on industry-
unemployment adjusted 
earnings moments 
  Model with industry-based 
instability/insurance effects 
  Model with occupation-based 
instability/insurance effects 
  Permanent  Transitory    Permanent  Transitory    Permanent  Transitory    Permanent  Transitory 




                                     
1981  0.9523  0.0032  0.9235  0.0033    0.9347  0.0038  0.9374  0.0034    0.9524  0.0032  0.9348  0.0035    0.9350  0.0028  1.0838  0.0062 
1982  0.8801  0.0038  0.8884  0.0039    0.8709  0.0044  0.9173  0.0040    0.8804  0.0038  0.9094  0.0046    0.8626  0.0038  1.1548  0.0079 
1983  0.8687  0.0041  0.8585  0.0041    0.8736  0.0049  0.8813  0.0042    0.8694  0.0041  0.8836  0.0051    0.8518  0.0042  1.1464  0.0084 
1984  0.8660  0.0044  0.8243  0.0041    0.8839  0.0052  0.8453  0.0042    0.8666  0.0044  0.8478  0.0050    0.8521  0.0046  1.1004  0.0083 
1985  0.8585  0.0045  0.8214  0.0042    0.8838  0.0054  0.8405  0.0042    0.8590  0.0045  0.8424  0.0048    0.8485  0.0047  1.0982  0.0084 
1986  0.8505  0.0047  0.8092  0.0041    0.8886  0.0057  0.8294  0.0041    0.8509  0.0047  0.8309  0.0049    0.8345  0.0050  1.1057  0.0087 
1987  0.7864  0.0054  0.7833  0.0042    0.8173  0.0064  0.8234  0.0043    0.7869  0.0054  0.8073  0.0050    0.7786  0.0064  1.1215  0.0088 
1988  0.7739  0.0054  0.7478  0.0042    0.8060  0.0065  0.7868  0.0042    0.7739  0.0054  0.7705  0.0049    0.7631  0.0064  1.0989  0.0089 
1989  0.7575  0.0055  0.7193  0.0042    0.7903  0.0065  0.7570  0.0042    0.7564  0.0055  0.7385  0.0047    0.7459  0.0065  1.0838  0.0090 
1990  0.7628  0.0056  0.6928  0.0041    0.8015  0.0067  0.7337  0.0042    0.7607  0.0056  0.7105  0.0046    0.7428  0.0065  1.0755  0.0091 
1991  0.7315  0.0055  0.6901  0.0042    0.7667  0.0066  0.7286  0.0043    0.7295  0.0055  0.7086  0.0047    0.7146  0.0065  1.0906  0.0095 
1992  0.6921  0.0061  0.6820  0.0042    0.7354  0.0073  0.7202  0.0043    0.6918  0.0061  0.7033  0.0049    0.7022  0.0076  1.0562  0.0095 
1993  0.7240  0.0064  0.6159  0.0039    0.7691  0.0077  0.6507  0.0040    0.7240  0.0064  0.6379  0.0047    0.7038  0.0077  1.0056  0.0089 
1994  0.7321  0.0065  0.6185  0.0038    0.7903  0.0079  0.6527  0.0039    0.7324  0.0065  0.6427  0.0047    0.7017  0.0078  1.0106  0.0090 
1995  0.7094  0.0063  0.5680  0.0043    0.7715  0.0077  0.6040  0.0044    0.7106  0.0063  0.5872  0.0049    0.6600  0.0074  1.0674  0.0112 
1996  0.6818  0.0053  0.5588  0.0045    0.7273  0.0064  0.5983  0.0046    0.6823  0.0053  0.5808  0.0052           
1997  0.6375  0.0050  0.5819  0.0048    0.6830  0.0060  0.6214  0.0049    0.6377  0.0050  0.6091  0.0059           
1998  0.6311  0.0049  0.6350  0.0052    0.6696  0.0059  0.6743  0.0053    0.6306  0.0049  0.6687  0.0067           
1999  0.5949  0.0046  0.6688  0.0055    0.6272  0.0055  0.7110  0.0055    0.5938  0.0046  0.7098  0.0075           
2000  0.5728  0.0045  0.7001  0.0057    0.6029  0.0053  0.7412  0.0057    0.5712  0.0044  0.7469  0.0081           
2001  0.5463  0.0043  0.7287  0.0060    0.5717  0.0050  0.7707  0.0059    0.5444  0.0043  0.7796  0.0087           
2002  0.5065  0.0040  0.7315  0.0060    0.5287  0.0047  0.7738  0.0060    0.5049  0.0040  0.7895  0.0094           





                                     
1943  0.6104  0.0061  0.8544  0.0089    0.6164  0.0066  0.8536  0.0087    0.6093  0.0060  0.8562  0.0089    0.5975  0.0059  0.8964  0.0094 
1944  0.6281  0.0061  0.8620  0.0084    0.6314  0.0066  0.8676  0.0082    0.6273  0.0061  0.8699  0.0085    0.6162  0.0060  0.8957  0.0090 
1945  0.6399  0.0061  0.8653  0.0079    0.6469  0.0066  0.8673  0.0078    0.6393  0.0061  0.8678  0.0081    0.6258  0.0060  0.9088  0.0087 
1946  0.6539  0.0061  0.8801  0.0074    0.6528  0.0066  0.8912  0.0072    0.6536  0.0061  0.8870  0.0076    0.6471  0.0061  0.9090  0.0085 
1947  0.6796  0.0064  0.9082  0.0072    0.6805  0.0069  0.9126  0.0071    0.6793  0.0064  0.9165  0.0074    0.6769  0.0064  0.9321  0.0085 
1948  0.7127  0.0068  0.9113  0.0072    0.7103  0.0073  0.9211  0.0070    0.7127  0.0068  0.9276  0.0077    0.7118  0.0068  0.9369  0.0083 
1949  0.7285  0.0072  0.9191  0.0072    0.7269  0.0077  0.9304  0.0070    0.7284  0.0072  0.9257  0.0073    0.7373  0.0072  0.9342  0.0079 
1950  0.7505  0.0073  0.9086  0.0070    0.7509  0.0079  0.9165  0.0069    0.7503  0.0073  0.9234  0.0073    0.7598  0.0074  0.9273  0.0077 
1951  0.7936  0.0077  0.9199  0.0070    0.7919  0.0084  0.9252  0.0069    0.7943  0.0077  0.9419  0.0078    0.8060  0.0079  0.9446  0.0079 
1952  0.8232  0.0080  0.9160  0.0069    0.8183  0.0085  0.9255  0.0067    0.8234  0.0080  0.9253  0.0071    0.8413  0.0083  0.9308  0.0076 
1953  0.8408  0.0081  0.9298  0.0067    0.8361  0.0087  0.9360  0.0066    0.8411  0.0081  0.9419  0.0069    0.8640  0.0084  0.9420  0.0073 
1954  0.8620  0.0083  0.9400  0.0067    0.8568  0.0089  0.9464  0.0066    0.8621  0.0083  0.9537  0.0070    0.8804  0.0086  0.9612  0.0073 
1955  0.9054  0.0086  0.9501  0.0067    0.9056  0.0093  0.9582  0.0065    0.9075  0.0086  0.9558  0.0069    0.9230  0.0089  0.9619  0.0074 
1956  0.9394  0.0089  0.9606  0.0066    0.9438  0.0097  0.9661  0.0065    0.9409  0.0089  0.9686  0.0069    0.9439  0.0092  0.9812  0.0073 
1957  0.9758  0.0092  0.9739  0.0064    0.9759  0.0099  0.9783  0.0063    0.9766  0.0092  0.9722  0.0065    0.9772  0.0094  0.9916  0.0072 
1959  1.0246  0.0097  1.0029  0.0064    1.0309  0.0104  1.0014  0.0063    1.0250  0.0097  1.0006  0.0064    0.9920  0.0097  1.0164  0.0072 
1960  1.0334  0.0097  1.0787  0.0073    1.0357  0.0105  1.0602  0.0070    1.0323  0.0097  1.0647  0.0074    0.9877  0.0097  0.9031  0.0082 
1961  1.0495  0.0099  1.0865  0.0074    1.0548  0.0107  1.0666  0.0071    1.0502  0.0099  1.0743  0.0074    0.9778  0.0097  0.9144  0.0081 
1962  1.0698  0.0102  1.1293  0.0077    1.0741  0.0110  1.1105  0.0075    1.0696  0.0102  1.1134  0.0078    0.9830  0.0101  0.9443  0.0083 
1963  1.0880  0.0105  1.1601  0.0079    1.0984  0.0114  1.1339  0.0077    1.0873  0.0105  1.1441  0.0080    0.9569  0.0101  0.9807  0.0086 
1964  1.1241  0.0111  1.1948  0.0081    1.1284  0.0120  1.1681  0.0080    1.1213  0.0111  1.1757  0.0083    0.9672  0.0108  0.9980  0.0088 
1965  1.1342  0.0117  1.2415  0.0086    1.1501  0.0128  1.1998  0.0083    1.1316  0.0117  1.2205  0.0088    0.9596  0.0117  1.0299  0.0092 
1966  1.0982  0.0119  1.2875  0.0089    1.1085  0.0130  1.2438  0.0086    1.0953  0.0119  1.2694  0.0091    0.8942  0.0123  1.0677  0.0096 
1967  1.0246  0.0124  1.3367  0.0094    1.0244  0.0136  1.2903  0.0090    1.0206  0.0124  1.3165  0.0096    0.8369  0.0137  1.1000  0.0102 
1968  0.8855  0.0135  1.3855  0.0098    0.8729  0.0148  1.3441  0.0095    0.8810  0.0135  1.3726  0.0099    0.7294  0.0152  1.1505  0.0111 
1969 
0.6155     0.0112 
1.4866  0.0107   
0.6173    0.0120 
1.4282  0.0101   
0.6117   0.0112 
1.4614  0.0109   
0.5134     0.0147 
1.2488  0.0122 
1970  1.4588  0.0111    1.4044  0.0105    1.4501  0.0112    1.2643  0.0132 
1971  1.4695  0.0114    1.4097  0.0108    1.4528  0.0115    1.2810  0.0140 
1972  1.5354  0.0115    1.4697  0.0109    1.4860  0.0126    1.3275  0.0150 
1973  1.5653  0.0130    1.4926  0.0121    1.5189  0.0138    1.4064  0.0178 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Year    Number of observations    Average hourly wage 
(DKron, 2000 prices) 
  Standard deviation 
hourly wage 
  Age    Unemployment Insurance  





  Sample  Comparison 
population 
 
  Sample  Comparison 
population 
 
  Sample  Comparison 
population 
 
  Sample  Comparison 
population 
 
1980    315546  617993    155.75  161.88    46.05  54.76    29.28  35.83    0.80  0.79 
1981    326064  593473    155.63  161.43    44.48  52.52    29.87  36.00    0.81  0.80 
1982    350632  600548    156.25  161.57    45.17  52.42    30.34  36.02    0.84  0.83 
1983    376333  607457    157.75  162.39    47.00  53.72    30.81  36.02    0.84  0.83 
1984    415394  641090    157.38  161.12    48.15  54.10    31.22  35.93    0.85  0.84 
1985    450544  679105    162.30  164.82    50.39  55.53    31.56  35.85    0.84  0.84 
1986    473543  691902    166.64  168.19    52.93  57.45    31.98  35.88    0.85  0.84 
1987    483039  677038    176.58  178.04    55.89  60.55    32.43  35.95    0.89  0.88 
1988    490382  661274    180.40  181.86    58.80  63.21    32.93  36.12    0.89  0.88 
1989    509895  666010    181.28  182.45    60.49  64.53    33.42  36.25    0.90  0.89 
1990    524817  666719    188.35  189.61    64.63  68.82    34.07  36.57    0.90  0.89 
1991    540737  678325    191.50  191.74    66.45  70.02    34.62  36.79    0.90  0.89 
1992    551213  672796    190.16  190.14    65.77  69.11    35.15  36.93    0.93  0.92 
1993    558019  663030    182.33  181.99    65.91  68.66    35.69  37.10    0.94  0.93 
1994    592607  691533    185.51  184.83    70.87  73.52    36.10  37.06    0.94  0.93 
1995    606268  710180    189.13  186.70    71.06  73.01    36.81  37.11    0.95  0.93 
1996    625657  739065    190.65  186.64    71.78  72.94    37.62  37.27    0.90  0.88 
1997    635777  757390    189.67  184.28    71.02  71.41    38.45  37.39    0.90  0.87 
1998    643997  770231    198.18  190.94    77.05  76.47    39.31  37.52    0.90  0.86 
1999    639439  780972    198.63  190.83    77.82  76.74    39.79  37.74    0.89  0.85 
2000    617047  788308    202.00  192.65    80.81  78.77    40.40  37.81    0.89  0.84 
2001    585760  779092    206.95  196.44    84.16  81.14    40.96  37.96    0.89  0.84 
2002    593564  954674    204.99  192.86    81.78  76.39    41.73  38.67    0.89  0.82 
2003    563419  935796    200.28  188.20    80.11  74.49    42.24  38.80    0.89  0.81 
                               
All years    12469693  17024001    184.94  181.49    69.20  69.14    35.95  36.96    0.89  0.86 
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Table 2: Cohort structure 
  Cohort born in  
  1943  1944  1945  1946  1947  1948  1949  1950  1951  1952  1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958 
Year                                 
1980  5.6  6.2  6.6  6.8  6.6  6.3  5.9  5.9  5.7  5.7  5.8  5.6  5.7  5.7  5.5  5.4 
1981  5.4  6.0  6.4  6.5  6.3  6.0  5.6  5.6  5.4  5.5  5.6  5.4  5.4  5.4  5.3  5.1 
1982  5.1  5.6  6.0  6.2  5.9  5.6  5.3  5.3  5.1  5.2  5.2  5.1  5.2  5.2  5.1  5.0 
1983  4.8  5.3  5.7  5.8  5.6  5.3  5.0  5.0  4.8  4.9  4.9  4.9  5.0  5.0  4.9  4.9 
1984  4.5  5.0  5.3  5.5  5.2  5.0  4.7  4.7  4.5  4.6  4.7  4.6  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.8 
1985  4.2  4.6  4.9  5.1  4.9  4.6  4.4  4.4  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.4  4.5  4.6  4.6  4.7 
1986  3.9  4.4  4.6  4.8  4.7  4.4  4.2  4.1  4.0  4.1  4.2  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.4  4.5 
1987  3.7  4.1  4.4  4.6  4.4  4.2  3.9  3.9  3.8  3.9  4.0  4.0  4.1  4.2  4.2  4.3 
1988  3.6  4.0  4.3  4.4  4.2  4.0  3.8  3.8  3.7  3.7  3.8  3.8  3.9  4.0  4.0  4.1 
1989  3.4  3.8  4.1  4.2  4.1  3.8  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.6  3.8  3.9  3.8  3.9 
1990  3.3  3.7  3.9  4.1  3.9  3.7  3.5  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.5  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.9 
1991  3.2  3.5  3.8  3.9  3.8  3.6  3.4  3.4  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.6  3.7 
1992  3.0  3.4  3.6  3.8  3.7  3.5  3.3  3.3  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.5  3.6 
1993  2.9  3.2  3.5  3.7  3.5  3.4  3.2  3.2  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.4  3.5 
1994  2.7  3.1  3.3  3.5  3.4  3.2  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.4 
1995  2.6  3.0  3.2  3.4  3.3  3.1  3.0  3.0  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3 
1996  2.5  2.8  3.2  3.3  3.2  3.1  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3 
1997  2.4  2.7  3.1  3.3  3.2  3.1  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3 
1998  2.3  2.7  3.0  3.2  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.9  3.0  2.9  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.2 
1999  0.0  2.6  2.9  3.1  3.1  3.1  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3 
2000  0.0  0.0  3.0  3.2  3.2  3.1  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.4 
2001  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  3.3  3.2  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.4  3.5 
2002  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.5  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.5  3.4  3.6  3.7  3.7  3.8 
2003  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.5  3.4  3.4  3.3  3.5  3.6  3.5  3.7  3.8  3.8  3.9 
                                 
All years  2.6  3.0  3.4  3.7  3.8  3.8  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.6  3.7  3.8  3.8  3.9 
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Table 2 ctnd. 
  Cohort born in 
  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
Year                               
1980  5.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1981  4.9  4.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1982  4.8  4.8  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1983  4.8  4.7  4.5  4.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1984  4.7  4.7  4.6  4.4  4.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1985  4.6  4.7  4.6  4.5  4.5  4.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1986  4.5  4.6  4.6  4.5  4.5  4.4  4.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1987  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.4  4.5  4.4  4.2  3.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1988  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.3  4.5  4.4  4.2  3.9  3.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1989  3.9  4.1  4.1  4.2  4.4  4.4  4.2  4.0  3.5  2.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1990  3.8  4.0  4.1  4.1  4.3  4.3  4.2  4.1  3.5  2.8  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1991  3.7  3.9  3.9  4.0  4.2  4.3  4.2  4.2  3.6  3.0  2.5  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1992  3.6  3.7  3.8  4.0  4.1  4.2  4.2  4.2  3.6  3.1  2.7  2.3  2.0  0.0  0.0 
1993  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.8  4.1  4.1  4.1  4.1  3.7  3.2  2.8  2.5  2.2  1.8  0.0 
1994  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.9  4.0  4.1  4.1  3.7  3.3  3.0  2.8  2.6  2.3  1.6 
1995  3.3  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.9  4.0  4.1  4.2  3.8  3.4  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.6  2.0 
1996  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.7  3.9  4.0  4.1  4.2  3.8  3.5  3.2  3.1  3.0  2.8  2.3 
1997  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.9  4.0  4.1  4.2  3.9  3.5  3.3  3.2  3.2  3.0  2.5 
1998  3.2  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.8  4.0  4.1  4.2  3.9  3.6  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.1  2.7 
1999  3.3  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.9  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.0  3.7  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.3  2.9 
2000  3.4  3.6  3.7  3.8  4.0  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.1  3.8  3.6  3.5  3.6  3.4  3.0 
2001  3.6  3.7  3.8  3.9  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.5  4.2  3.9  3.7  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.1 
2002  3.8  3.9  4.0  4.0  4.3  4.4  4.4  4.6  4.2  3.9  3.6  3.5  3.6  3.4  3.0 
2003  3.9  4.1  4.1  4.2  4.4  4.5  4.6  4.7  4.4  4.0  3.8  3.6  3.7  3.5  3.1 
All years                               
Total  3.8  3.8  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.6  3.4  3.3  2.9  2.4  2.1  1.9  1.8  1.6  1.3 
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Table 3: UI membership dynamics by birth cohort  
Cohort  Entry rate  Exit rate 
     
1943  10.88  0.40 
1944  10.77  0.40 
1945  10.71  0.43 
1946  10.81  0.44 
1947  10.55  0.47 
1948  10.22  0.51 
1949  10.50  0.55 
1950  10.51  0.56 
1951  10.52  0.57 
1952  10.19  0.63 
1953  10.91  0.65 
1954  10.75  0.66 
1955  11.45  0.69 
1956  11.41  0.74 
1957  12.30  0.79 
1958  12.46  0.81 
1959  12.56  0.83 
1960  13.55  0.83 
1961  11.97  0.81 
1962  12.16  0.8 
1963  12.51  0.82 
1964  12.96  0.80 
1965  13.99  0.85 
1966  13.97  0.92 
1967  16.06  0.96 
1968  15.31  1.00 
1969  15.50  1.14 
1970  15.42  1.21 
1971  15.53  1.38 
1972  14.83  1.53 
1973  15.49  1.69 
All cohorts  12.23  0.74 
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Table 4: Baseline model and model with UI membership: Core parameter estimates  
 
  Baseline Model    Model with unemployment 
insurance 
  Coeff.  S.E.    Coeff.  S.E. 
Permanent wage           
σ
2
α  0.0079  0.00073    0.0130  0.00069 
σ
2
β  0.0008  0.00002    0.0015  0.00005 
σαβ  -0.0034  0.00010    -0.0066  0.00023 
σ
2
δ        0.0015  0.00004 
σαδ         0.0032  0.00024 
σβδ        -0.0011  0.00003 
           
Transitory wage           
σ
2
0  0.0628  0.00059    0.0578  0.00064 
σ
2
ε  0.0335  0.00041    0.0012  0.00011 
ψ        3.8039  0.10568 
ρ  0.7737  0.00089    0.7279  0.00122 
           
SSR  0.1103    0.0992 
Note: the model includes flexible shifters for time periods and birth cohorts on each wage component, estimates 
are reported in Table A1. The model is estimated on 12469693 wage observations, corresponding to 811651 
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Table 5: Insurance membership as a function of lagged wage growth and lagged wage volatility 
 
    Joining    Joining and staying 
    FE-Logit    FE-OLS    FE-Logit    FE-OLS 
    Coeff.  S.E.    Coeff.  S.E.    Coeff.  S.E.    Coeff.  S.E. 
                         
Lagged wage growth    0.0289  0.0226    0.0008  0.0018    0.1450  0.0279    0.0275  0.0042 
                             
Lagged volatility 
(squared)   
-0.0539  0.0067    -0.0075  0.0009    -0.0225  0.0042    -0.0021  0.0003 
                             
Lagged volatility 
(absolute)   
-0.0011  0.0001    -0.0002  0.0000    -0.0004  0.0001    -0.00003  0.00000 
                             
Note: each estimate comes from a different model. Regressions include controls for industry, local unemployment rates, age and time trends. Wage volatility is defined as 
the squared or absolute deviation of wages from the individual mean wage computed over a rolling window spanning the five years prior to observation, summed over 
the five years 
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Table 6: Sensitivity analysis on variance components models 
 
  Main model on industry-
unemployment adjusted 
wages 
  Model with industry 
effects in the transitory 
component 
  Model with occupation 
effects in the transitory 
component (1980-1995) 
  Coeff.  S.E.    Coeff.  S.E.    Coeff.  S.E. 
Permanent wage                 
σ
2
α  0.0172  0.00067    0.0142  0.00070    0.0527  0.00119 
σ
2
β  0.0015  0.00004    0.0016  0.00005    0.0021  0.00005 
σαβ  -0.0056  0.00020    -0.0065  0.00023    -0.0091  0.00014 
σ
2
δ  0.0015  0.00004    0.0016  0.00004    0.0020  0.00005 
σαδ  0.0024  0.00020    0.0030  0.00024    0.0032 
σβδ  -0.0011  0.00003    -0.0011  0.00003    -0.0015  0.00003 
                 
Transitory wage                 
σ
2
0  0.0552  0.00060    0.0558  0.00065    0.0371  0.00050 
σ
2
ε  0.0016  0.00014    0.0010  0.00009    0.0032  0.00034 
ψ  3.4258  0.09971             
ψ1        14.4083  1.32379    2.4625  0.14256 
ψ2        3.3866  0.11815    1.4313  0.10979 
ρ  0.7017  0.00119    0.7234  0.00128    0.5161  0.00170 
                 
SSR  0.0885    0.0989    0.0264 
Note: the model includes flexible shifters for time periods and birth cohorts on each wage component, estimates are reported in Table A1. The model 
is estimated on 12469693 wage observations, corresponding to 811651 individuals observed between 1980 and 2003, and 6895 second moments of 
the  within  cohort  intertemporal  wage  distribution  (numbers  are  equal  to  7565033,  771899  and  2991  for  the  model  with  occupation  specific 
instability). 
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Figure 3: Permanent wage dispersion over the life-cycle by UI membership, net of 
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Figure 4: Components of wage dispersion over the life-cycle by UI membership 
a)  Permanent dispersion 
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